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Very little empirical evidence exists on the relationship between intellectual property 
rights and innovation. Existing studies tend to be indirect and do not consider the 
influence of IPRs on innovation per se; nor do they adequately allow for the 
endogeneity of IPRs. Correcting for these omissions, we show that the strength of 
intellectual property protection has a strong positive influence on innovation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The fact that governments, corporate bodies, and advocacy groups spanning the 
developing and developed worlds argued bitterly for more than eight years before the 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement was finally signed in 
1994 reflects, inter alia, the need for more persuasive evidence than is currently 
available, on the (presumed) causality running from intellectual property rights (IPRs) to 
innovation. Ex-ante several possibilities arise. First, strengthening IPRs all-round could 
lead to greater innovation in developed countries (Segerstrom 1991; Levin et.al. 1987)  
which, in turn, could be helpful for developing countries. Often, though, developed 
country innovations are inappropriate for developing countries. Second, strengthening 
protection could lead to greater innovation in developing countries as well, if only by 
ensuring foreign direct investment and technology transfer from the North to the South 
(Taylor 1993, 1994). Third, strengthening protection may not spur innovation 
significantly, and may well hamper it by constraining knowledge flows – due to 
inadequate disclosure of the innovation in the patent application, the accumulation of 
sleeping patents, or the inhibition of imitation (Bessen and Maskin 2000; Gilbert and 
Newbery 1982; Roffe 1974). It was precisely these concerns that the prolonged 
negotiations for the TRIPs agreement reflected.  
  Therefore, the link between intellectual property rights and innovation is essential 
to explore and understand. As things stand, very little empirical evidence exists on this 
relationship. Schankerman (1998) and Lerner (1994) study the effect of patenting on 
the valuation of firms, and Park and Ginarte (1997) and Gould and Gruben (1996) study 
the effect of stronger IPRs on economic growth. Neither of these studies, however, 
consider the influence of intellectual property protection on innovation per se;
1 nor do  2 
they allow for the possibility of the endogeneity of intellectual property rights. It is 
important to realise that the protection-innovation relationship may run both ways – not 
only may protection influence innovation, but the presence of innovations may well 
determine what level of protection is provided. Thus, it is often argued that developing 
countries provide weaker IPRs because they have few innovations to protect and want 
to benefit from foreign technology via imitation, whereas developed countries provide 
stronger protection because they have something to protect (Ginarte and Park, 1997; 
Lerner, 2002).  
  This paper attempts to correct for both the shortcomings noted above. We 
consider the relationship between research and development investment (in lieu of 
innovation) and an index pf patent rights (in lieu of intellectual property protection), in a 
two-equation framework. Our results show that the strength of IPRs has a strong 
positive influence on innovation. Section 2 sets up a theoretical model which motivates 
the estimation model. Section 3 discusses the estimating equations and data employed. 
Section 4 provides a discussion of the results and conclusions. 
 
2. The theoretical model 
Consider a monopolist
2 using CRS technology given by the relation 
Qt  = A Lt
α Kt
1− α     0   <   α   <   1        ( 1 )
 
where Q is output, L is labour, K is the capital stock, and t the time period. We express 
the capital stock – comprising physical capital (KP) and knowledge capital (KK) – as 
Kt = θ KPt  + () 1− θ KKt   0  <  θ   <   1        ( 2 )  
to allow the elasticities of output w.r.t physical and knowledge capital to differ. The 
physical capital stock adjusts between periods according to the relation  3 
KPt  = KPt () − 1  + It            ( 3 )  
where  I is investment (and we ignore depreciation for simplicity). Similarly, the 
knowledge capital stock adjusts between periods according to the relation 
KKt  = BKKt () −
−
1
1 σ Rt− 1
σ            ( 4 )  
where  B is the technological shock, and Rt-1 is the research and development 
expenditure in period t-1. While (3) is an accounting relationship (4) is not, so that a 
doubling of the R&D expenditure does not necessarily augment the knowledge capital 
by like amount. The productivity of R&D expenditure will depend, inter alia, upon the 
skill levels of the personnel involved. Capturing skill levels by education levels (EDU), 
we have σ = σ(EDU). 
  The adjustment in the physical capital stock naturally involves some cost, which 
would be directly proportional to the amount of investment undertaken, and the market 
rate of interest on borrowed funds (i). For our purposes, it suffices to specify this 
adjustment cost as 
C t 1  = iIt            ( 5 )  
Similarly, the adjustment in the knowledge capital stock also entails some cost, which 
would be directly proportional to the amount of R&D expenditures undertaken, and the 
cost of funds (r) used for this purpose. The adjustment cost on this score may, then, be 
written as 
C t 2  = rRt             ( 6 )  
Given the difficulty in raising market loans for R&D projects due to their risky nature, 
R&D investment often depends on internal funds (S). The cost of funds used for R&D 
would then depend upon i and S, i.e. r = r(i, S). 
  Assuming that the firm operates for two periods (as in Lee and Shin, 2000), its  4 
period t profits may be written as 
π t  =  PQI PQ tt tt (; ) – wLt  – C t 1  – C t 2         ( 7 )  
where P is the price of output, w is the nominal wage rate, IP is intellectual property 
protection, and the other variables are as defined above. The firm faces a downward-
sloping demand curve such that Pt is a negative function of Qt, given the 'institutional 
environment' within which it operates. Thus, the firm would be able to charge a relatively 
higher price for a given output if it had the benefit of strong intellectual property 
protection (IP) for its product, than if it did not. 
  Based on the realised current price and the distribution of the expected future 
price, the firm decides on the optimal employment and investments. Given the condition 
0 = ∂ ∂ t t L π , optimal employment may be derived as 




















− 11 /( )
P t
11 /( ) − α Kt        ( 8 )  
where η  is the price-elasticity of demand. Substituting this expression in the profit 
function yields 
π t  = g(α )  P t
11 /( ) − α (KPt () − 1 +It +BRt− 1
σ ) – iIt – rRt        ( 9 )  
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Period 2 profit may then be written as 
π t  = g(α )  P 2
11 /( ) − α (KP1+I2+BR1
σ ) – iI2                      (10) 
(where we have omitted the last term in 'rR2', because that would not figure in the firm's 
calculations given that period 2 is the last period). Using this expression, the condition 
∂π ∂ 22 / I =0, gives us  5 
I2 = [ iK η 2 –g(α ) PK 1
11
2
/( ) − α η –g(α ) P 1
11 /( ) − α (KP1+BR1
σ ) ]  [ g(α ) P 1
11 /( ) − α ]
− 1
            (11) 
Substituting (11) in (10), we can re-write the latter as 
π t  = iK η 2 – g(α ) PK 1
11
2
/( ) − α η  – i [ iK η 2  – g(α ) PK 1
11
2
/( ) − α η  – g(α ) P 1
11 /( ) − α (KP1+BR1
σ ) ]   
 x  [ g(α ) P 1
11 /( ) − α ]
− 1
                          (12) 
Using (9), period 1 profits may be written as 
π 1 = g(α )  P 1
11 /( ) − α (KP0 + I1 + BR0
σ ) – iI1 – rR1                   (13) 
In period 1 the firm chooses R1 and I1 to maximise Φ  = π 1+E(π 2 ). Being specifically 
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3. The estimating equations 
The above model cannot be estimated, however, because firm-level data are not 
available for the strength of intellectual property protection.
4 Data for this variable are 
only available at the country-level. Keeping this in mind, based on the model above we 
specify the estimation equation as 
BERD = f(IP, ∆ GDPPC, EDU, St-1, RLR)       ( 1 5 )  
where R&D investment is represented by business enterprise R&D as a proportion of 
GDP (BERD); the strength of intellectual property protection is measured by the 
Ginarte-Park index of patent rights (IP) which ranges from 0 to 5, with higher numbers 
indicating stronger protection; expected market conditions or E(P2) are captured by the 
change in GDP per capita (∆ GDPPC); the stock of human capital is measured by the  6 
average years of education for the population aged 15 and over (EDU); internal funds 
are proxied by gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP, lagged one period(St-1); 
and the cost of borrowed funds is represented by the real lending rate of interest (RLR). 
    Using country-level data, however, introduces a problem. Although the strength 
of IPRs is exogenous to the R&D decisions of a firm (in a given country), it may not be 
exogenous for the totality of firms (in that country). Indeed, as we pointed out above, 
many argue that the strength of intellectual property rights provided by a country 
depends on its level of development (which, in turn, depends on the level of innovative 
activity in that country). In other words, variable IP is no longer exogenous. To 
circumvent this problem, we first derive instrumental variable estimates  IP ∃  using the 
following estimation equation, and then use IP ∃  in lieu of IP in equation (15) above: 
IP = h(GDPPC, EDU, GREVPC, EFI, BMP)                   (16) 
where GDP per capita (GDPPC) and the stock of human capital (EDU) reflect a 
country’s level of development;
5 government revenue per capita (GREVPC) measures 
the government’s financial ability to provide protection; the economic freedom index 
(EFI) reflects the overall institutional climate (ranging form 0 to 10, with higher numbers 
indicating more freedom); and the black market exchange rate premium (BMP) proxies 
the openness of the economy to external competition.
6 
    The dataset pertain to 44 developing and developed countries for the period 
1981-2000. Because the relationships in question are of a long-run nature, we estimate 
them using quinquennial averages obtained from the annual data. Our procedure 
implies four ‘observations’ for each country (‘1985’ or the average for 1981-85, ‘1990’ or 
the average for 1986-90, ‘1995 or the average for 1991-95, and ‘2000’ or the average 
for 1996-00), or a total of 176 observations. All variables are in logs. Random effects  7 
GLS estimates are derived for both equations. 
 
4. Results and Conclusions 
We first discuss the results for equation (16), which feeds into equation (15). Table 1 
shows that all variables have the expected signs, the hypothesis that the regressand is 
randomly determined is strongly rejected, and the Hausman test strongly supports the 
random effects estimator. The strength of protection provided by countries does, 
indeed, appear to vary positively with their levels of development – the per capita GDP 
variable is significant at the 10% level using a one-tail test, and the human capital 
variable is highly significant at the 1% level. It might be too cynical, however, to ascribe 
the levels of protection solely to this consideration. The availability of resources to the 
government is also important, as evidenced by the strong significance of the per capita 
gross revenue variable. Finally, the strength of protection a country provides also 
depends positively on the competition it faces internationally, as is implied by the strong 
negative significance of the black market exchange rate premium variable. Only the 
economic freedom index is insignificant, but has the expected positive sign. 
    Coming to the estimation results of equation (15), Table 2 reveals that none of 
the variables have a wrong sign and are significant, the hypothesis that the dependent 
variable is randomly determined is strongly rejected, and the Hausman test strongly 
supports the random effects estimator. We find that the strength of protection has a 
strong positive influence on R&D expenditure. In addition, the demand-pull factor 
∆ GDPPC also has a strongly positive effect on the regressand. Both the human capital 
variable EDU and the internal funds proxy St-1 have the expected positive effect on R&D 
expenditure, although they are insignificant using the conventional test criterion. The  8 
cost of funds variable RLR has the wrong sign, but is highly insignificant. 
    We further test the hypothesis that too strong a level of protection hurts 
innovation (Bessen and Maskin, 2004; Helpman, 1993), and the results are:  
BERD = –3.493 + 0.734IP ∃  + 0.277 IP
2 + 0.836∆ GDPPC + 0.370 EDU + 0.255 St-1 + 0.017 RLR 
             (–5.40)     (1.30)         (2.50)          (2.11)                      (0.97)            (1.57)          (0.31) 
(with z-values in parentheses). We find, as above, that stronger protection implies 
stronger R&D (although at the 10% level using a one-tail test). This relationship does 
not become negative when levels of protection rise non-linearly – the coefficient of IP
2 is 
positive and strongly significant, although it is about one-third the coefficient of  IP ∃  itself. 
The other variables behave as before, with the difference that now St-1 is also significant 
(using a one-tail test). 
    Our results enable us to conclude that the strength of intellectual property 
protection that countries provide, has a strongly positive influence on business 
enterprise R&D expenditure and, thus, on innovation. This relation, it appears, does not 
turn negative as levels of protection rise non-linearly.  9 
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 Table 1 
Random effects GLS estimates (dependent variable: IP) 
Variable  Coefficient    z  90% confidence interval 
GDPPC    0.053    1.53  ( –0.004               0.111) 
EDU    0.291    2.76  (   0.118               0.465) 
GREVPC    0.061    2.54  (   0.022               0.101) 
BMP  –0.018  –3.96  ( –0.025             –0.010) 
EFI    0.009    0.08  ( –0.163               0.181) 
Intercept  –0.411  –1.89  ( –0.769             –0.053) 
     
No. of observations: 176 
Wald χ
2  (all slopes 0): 119.47 
R
2: 0.5052       
Hausman (specification test): 0.243 
     
  12 
Table 2 
Random effects GLS estimates (dependent variable: BERD) 
Variable  Coefficient    z  90% confidence interval 
IP ∃     1.139    2.17  (   0.274               2.004) 
∆ GDPPC    1.016    2.63  (   0.381               1.652) 
EDU    0.443    1.14  ( –0.195               1.082) 
St-1    0.207    1.27  ( –0.061               0.475) 
RLR    0.008    0.15  ( –0.081               0.098) 
Intercept  –3.270  –5.00  ( –4.347             –2.194) 
     
No. of observations: 176 
Wald χ
2  (all slopes 0): 59.75 
R
2: 0.4478       
Hausman (specification test): 0.103 
     
  13 
Notes 
                                                 
1 Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) is an exception, but it doesn’t consider an explicit 
measure of protection as a regressor.  
2  Because IPRs bestows monopoly power. We could talk in terms of oligopoly instead, but 
that would complicate the analysis without adding to our understanding of the innovation-
protection relationship. 
3 An expression for I1 may be similarly derived. Evidence shows that while R&D Granger-
causes physical investment, the reverse is not true (Lach and Schankerman, 1989). 
4 Moreover, such data would not show much variation across firms or over time for any given 
country. 
5 In many countries per capita GDP is high due to rent accruing from a special resource (e.g. 
petroleum), and does not reflect their level of technical development per se. To correct for 
this, we include the human capital variable. 
6 The data sources are: IP (Ginarte and Park, 1997), EDU (Barro and Lee, 2000), EFI 
(Gwartney and Lawson, 2004), BMP (Pick’s Currency Yearbook, World Currency Yearbook), 
and other variables (UNESCO and World Bank).  
 
*  Complete list of working papers is available at the CDE website: 
    http://www.cdedse.org/worklist.pdf 
 
 